
























?In this paper, I analyze the Japanese takeover regime?especially, the shareholders’ vote at the shareholders’ 
meeting and the appraisal rights?from the welfare point of view given certain assumptions. I assume that the tar-
get company is a listed company with widely-dispersed shareholders (though, in certain cases, I assume a 
controlling shareholder). First, I analyze whether the shareholders’ vote will lead to the Kaldor-Hicks improve-
ment taking into account the unanimous vote, the majority (or special majority) vote and transaction costs 
(including, strategic behavior). Second, I analyze whether the appraisal rights will lead to the Kaldor-Hicks 
improvement, especially, when the appraisal rights are used in part of a risk arbitrage (merger arbitrage) transac-
tion. The current Japanese takeover regime with the special majority vote and appraisal rights can be largely 
understood as the measure to filter out the Kaldor-Hicks inefficient transactions, but it cannot exclude the possi-
bility of the risk arbitrage transaction using the appraisal rights.
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